LONDON (CWBN)_ Defence strategy and spending is being reviewed across the democracies after years of complacency. This recognises that changes in the strategic environment are taking place faster than anticipated and require urgent response and a shift in approach.
As examples, NATO has launched a ‘reflection process’ on its more challenging security environment and what should be the desirable shape and role of the Alliance in 10 years’ time. The US Congress ‘Future of Defense Task Force’ has called for a ‘major course correction’ in the US approach to national security. The United Kingdom is progressing rapidly with its “Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy” to help set the long-term strategic aims for UK national and international security, bolstering Britain’s capabilities. There are calls in India for a fresh military posture based on a new Grand Strategy. Australia has recently published its Defence Strategic Update.
These reviews share common threads:
- The world order is changing. The certainties of the past, the model of successful Western free-market economies, the ambition for democracy and commitments to the established rules-based system of post-World War 2 are under challenge. This has been driven primarily by the rise of China;
- The binary distinction between war and peace has been eroded by ‘grey zone’ conflict where subversion through disinformation using social media, cyberattack, economic coercion and unattributable aggressive action undermine our capabilities and the public confidence on which they are based;
- The realms of space and cyberspace have added new and awesome dimensions to the traditional domains of conflict;
- Our nations are under existential threat from the effects of climate change and the potential for weapons of mass infection and destruction in the hands of both rogue states and terrorist groups;
Without a strong economy, ambitious defence plans cannot be sustained. That is a truism. But, neglect of defence spending is always a mistake. Let us take the British experience over the past hundred years. In periods of apparent peace and in difficult economic times, the defence budget has, wrongly, been seen as a “regrettable necessity” if not a luxury spend, absorbing precious resources and manpower.
After the First World War, the massive British public spending cuts of 1922-23 (the so-called Geddes Axe) fell disproportionately on the armed forces. As a consequence Britain was left in a state of unpreparedness. Defence spending restraint continued into the mid-1930s while our potential enemy was already spending three times as much as us. We almost left it too late to wake up.
After the massive and exhausting exertions of the Second World War leading to victory and peace, there were rapid cutbacks. There was then a spike in defence expenditure during the Korean War followed by massive defence cuts after the Suez crisis in 1956. Defence spending continued its spiral of decline. In 1964, the year I was commissioned into the British Army, at the height of the Cold War and with many extremist insurgencies to deal with, the defence budget was 5.9% of GDP. Throughout my military service, the armed forces suffered ‘salami cuts’ that reduced both military effectiveness and our international capabilities and commitments at cost to Britain’s international effectiveness.
The defence budget dropped below 5% of GDP in 1987, and then held at roughly 4%. Not unreasonably, a dramatic fall came with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the removal of the Warsaw Pact threat. But this proved to be far from the predicted ‘end of history’. New threats soon arose and Britain was slow to respond. Now we hover on the barely acceptable 2% point – a modest and reasonably achievable spending target for all NATO allies, which most are failing to meet.
The relationship between defence spending and economic well-being has been a subject of academic dispute for decades. Defence spending has often been a scapegoat for poor economic performance and balance of payments difficulties. But other factors such as complacency and under investment offer a better explanation for poor economic growth. At the same time, insufficient attention has been paid to the wider economic, political, technological and social benefits of defence spending.
In many countries, of course, the armed forces have been seen as agents of modernisation and of national cohesion. Britain is the only European nation with a combination of full-spectrum military capabilities, global reach, continual operational experience, and, usually, robust political will. As Britain enhances its global role post-Brexit, the contribution of the armed forces will be crucial and necessary – as a signal of presence and commitment to allies, to protect the interests that we share, not least in the freedom of the seas, to convene coalitions of the willing, and to provide urgent humanitarian response. Britain should become the indispensable ally.
The attempted communist takeover of the Korean peninsula, the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, and the seizure of Eastern Ukraine, would probably not have happened, if the aggressor had thought these territories would be robustly defended. The commitment of NATO allies to the defence of the European democracies, the defence guarantees to the Republic of Korea, to Japan and to Taiwan, the protection of Kuwait from Iraq in 1964, the Commonwealth defence of the newly formed state of Malaysia in 1965, and the fearsome determination of Israel to defend its territory and its very existence, are all examples of credible deterrence and readiness.
If we cherish continued freedom, security and prosperity, more money needs to be spent on defence, much of it differently than in the past. The lessons are clear.
- strengthen the capabilities and resilience of our armed forces and intelligence services;
- make a step-change in investment in research and development, protected from hostile espionage and acquisition, so that we become masters of the new domains of potential conflict;
- strengthen national resilience. The Covid-19 plague has exposed the weaknesses in even the most advanced societies where there have been difficulties in producing and distributing the most basic protective equipment, where technology has been ineffectively harnessed, and the confidence of fearful populations is fragile;
- enliven a positive commitment of our people, particularly the young, to freedom, opportunity and democracy so that they are less vulnerable to fake news, conspiracy theories and the seemingly inexorable success of the autocratic alternative;
- in the face of the new threats and challenges to our security and way of life, regenerate the solidarity and trust of our people, revitalise existing alliances, and generate new and willing coalitions.
The Commonwealth largely comprises democracies whose underpinning is a common heritage which needs to be cherished and not denigrated and subverted. There is so much more that it could achieve in the wider fields of security, defence, mutual political and economic support, and resilience. In the past, the democracies have shown their ability to respond effectively in times of need. Britain has a unique contribution to make to this response.
There is no reason why our ingenuity and resourcefulness should not serve us well again. Freedom and security, of the individual and our nations, are precious commodities, often taken for granted, hard won, but too easily lost.
