Egypt and Saudi Arabia are working together on a joint maritime security arrangement to stabilize the world’s busiest and most dangerous shipping routes, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This arrangement, which was first mentioned in September 2025 and analyzed in December 2025, is part of Egypt’s efforts to secure shipping routes to its primary sources of income (Suez Canal), while at the same time giving Saudi Arabia a larger role in maintaining regional stability.
By making this arrangement, Egypt is trying to ensure that Saudi Arabia does not disrupt shipping to and from Egypt through the Red Sea, because a disruption of shipping would also result in a significant loss of revenue from transit fees to the Suez Canal. Additionally, Egypt’s economic reliance on shipping to and from the Suez Canal makes it very sensitive to any security agreement that could reduce its influence in the region, especially if that agreement is conducted under the auspices of Western powers, which the Saudi shift aims to address.
Houthi attacks and other maritime threats have always been a persistent issue. The new approach to addressing these issues is noteworthy. Reports say that Saudi Arabian officials and Egyptian officials had met to discuss developing a coordinated naval presence and intelligence-sharing systems to protect commercial shipping in the Red Sea, patrol the Bab al-Mandeb strait, and combat asymmetric maritime threats. To that end, this proposed cooperation would create a more Arab-centric solution to the problem than previous Multinational Task Forces (MTFs) that had utilized Western Naval Forces as part of their formation and operational capacity.
Therefore, there are considerable economic factors at stake: in 2024, many major shipping lines were forced to reroute vessels around Africa following attacks in the Red Sea. As a result, transit times increased significantly, thus increasing costs to shipping lines. By the end of 2025, with the prospect of improved maritime security, major shipping companies like Maersk began to anticipate returning to operation in the Suez Canal area. A credible regional force that has the full benefit of the Egyptian coastal region and the deep pockets and political clout of Saudi Arabia could reverse the economic trend towards using the longer routes around Africa via the Suez Canal and return to the more economical route via the Suez.
However, cooperation also faces challenges through the historic rivalry between Cairo’s leadership position in the region and competing interests from Gulf capitals. Political differences between Cairo and the UAE also raise concerns regarding the greater geopolitical aspects of current and future alliances, as well as their position on Israel and other regional players. Analysts insist that the details of these proposed patrols will matter; whether joint command structures, tactical engagement directives, and the geographical scope of operations (i.e., to include Somalia and any other coastal states) will ultimately determine how rhetoric translates to actual patrol operations.
Should the proposed Saudi–Egyptian security alliance be realized as an operational entity, the governance of the Red Sea will be fundamentally altered through the creation of naval power/equipment and diplomatic outreach cooperation with neighboring coastal states and corresponding commercial interests. The operationalization of this proposed maritime patrol operation ultimately will provide greater safety and security to global maritime trade and allow for the passage of goods through what have historically been key international trade routes and reflect shifting alliances in the region.
