Africa (Commonwealth) _ There are rumors that anonymous US officials have alerted Beijing to its intentions to build a permanent military outpost in Equatorial Guinea. If confirmed, the action marks a shift in China’s approach to Africa beyond the obvious geopolitical risks associated with the nation’s first-ever naval facility on the Atlantic. There are significant geopolitical ramifications to this.
Africa has been the destination of the first international tour taken by Chinese foreign ministers each year for more than thirty years. Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, visited Egypt, Tunisia, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire this year, carrying on the custom. Interestingly, all of these nations are coastline. Nevertheless, amid ongoing conjecture over China’s potential military outpost in Africa, China has a single base in Africa, which Prior evaluations have not included any of these countries as key prospective candidates. China’s long-term plan is still unknown, though.
China operates one base in Africa, which opened in the Horn of Africa in 2017 in Djibouti. As part of an effort to secure economic corridors alongside developing options like the lengthier but less disputed Mozambique-South Africa route, the overt purposes of this installation are anti-piracy and freedom of navigation.
The attacks by pirates on commerce in the waters off Somalia and the ongoing attacks by Houthi rebels on commercial ships in the Red maritime have confirmed Djibouti’s strategic importance and the need to maintain the navigability of nearby maritime routes, such as the Bab al Mandab Strait.
Moreover, China had to defend some 35,000 individuals in the Libyan conflict of 2011 with extremely few resources on the ground—a failure that purportedly supported the establishment of an African base.
Djibouti is unique, though, in that it has a large number of foreign bases and is strategically valuable geographically to several international allies. Indeed, the only other bases on the continent are in that location—those of Saudi Arabia and Japan. China’s Djibouti facility provides us very little insight into the country’s strategic thinking when it comes to growing its military presence in the area.
Expanding Accountability
In times of crisis, military bases may really be a burden for their foreign governments. One of the U.S. military’s largest investments in the continent, Air Base 201 has been hampered by the coup last year. The U.S. military is fighting to maintain the diplomatic space required to keep Air Base 201 operational in Niger. Though so far it has not been very successful, the US military is currently looking into alternative sites of presence in West Africa. Earlier this month, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited leaders in Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Angola, and it’s possible that during his tour, he discussed this subject.
In 2021, however, as French stations were closing throughout the Sahel and UN missions had to be relocated, the British had to engage in difficult discussions with Kenya to extend the lease on their training base was taken apart. In a similar vein, India’s abortive attempts to establish a military installation in the Seychelles serve as a metaphor for the path that travel takes across Africa.
But the African countries who host military bases may also face political risks as a result of these installations. Foreign bases are typically viewed with caution by African communities, political leaders, and institutions for several reasons, one of which being the belief that the foreign military may potentially compromise the domestic agenda or sovereignty of the host country.
Military base
There is growing ambivalence throughout Africa over the establishment of further foreign outposts. A 2016 AU Peace and Security Council resolution advised nations to use “circumspection” before approving new foreign bases, and given the region’s volatile geopolitical conditions, this opinion has subsequently become even more entrenched.
It is more probable that China will want to develop dual-use facilities at African ports it has invested in, as well as extend the current civilian port infrastructure. Under the dual-use base concept, China downplays the military relevance of its strategic port investments by combining access to a limited number of military facilities with commercial ports. China claims that its state-owned shippers have either built, funded, or are currently operating 100 ports in Africa.
In fact, Wang’s visit to Africa seems to have been more about demonstrating China’s ongoing commitment to high-level relations on the continent than it was about forging a new basing deal. However, there’s reason to think Wang will have had a chance to talk about China’s security concerns whilst visiting Africa. This may have included fishing and piracy interests along the beaches of Togo and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as shipping lines connecting Tunisia and Egypt to the Mediterranean and Suez Canal. A more thorough explanation of China’s Global Security Initiative may have also been included.
In any case, China is currently dealing with a more assertive and multipolar Africa, which is pressuring other countries to define their security interests in terms of who and what they are protecting. In order to safeguard or further its interests, China will probably keep pushing for buy-ins, but it will still be reliant on regional politics and the unique connections they entail.
Overall, it may be better to see this most recent senior-level Chinese visit to coastal Africa as politics of the possible rather than something more tangible for the time being.
