(CU)_Onik Gasparyan, Chief of General Staff of the Armenian Army and other senior commanders made a public statement requesting for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to step down after Armenia’s humiliating loss in the Second Karabakh war last year. This announcement was made on February 25th and in response to this call, Prime Minister Pashinyan dismissed Gasparyan from office.
Probing as to what was the actual cause and who should be held responsible for the loss seems useless in a gloomy political arena of all three South Caucasus states (including Georgia and its current woes). Most Armenians are of the opinion that the protests lean more on the side of internal democratic processes while of course there is an unquestionable diplomatic context to it too. The most significant issue is the international implications of the conflict particularly as the early stages of the Russian-brokered November 2020 ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan are now being executed.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said on February 26 that the political upheaval in Armenia is not a deterrent factor in the implementation of the agreement on Nagorno-Karabakh. In an array of statements made by the Russian leadership, they implied that the Kremlin, which watchfully follows the internal development of its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) ally and the fellow member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), is however continuing to be reserved for the moment. Russia has encountered many crises along its borders with a certain sense of refinement and effectively managing almost exact coincidental crises in Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia-Azerbaijan.
Case by case, the Kremlin has got down to removing the benefits from international trade. Taking into consideration the current status of the Armenian crisis, the opposition although has some kind of support it’s not as much as the current leadership. This being said, Leaders from both wings have their links with senior Russian leaders, although the Kremlin was more comfortable with the pre-Pashinyan Armenian political chosen few. They understood what Russia likes in the near-abroad – cautious leaders, mindful of Russian sensitivities, and unwilling to play the reformist and Western cards that Pashinyan has used since coming to power in 2018.
Still, no matter how uneasy liberal Russia feels with the activist Pashinyan Government, it is needed for the moment since his signature is placed on the November Ceasefire Agreement. With the initial stages of the agreement being executed, Russia is definitely having its vision on the reward – which is most notably the re-opening of the Soviet-era railways which will theoretically re-link Russia to Armenia via Azerbaijan terrain. Any sort of pandemonium or anarchy in Armenia will put at risk this key aim.
With time Pashinyan are becoming more and more dependent and this has been recognized by Russia and have realized that their vulnerability can be exploited. Similarly the opposition could also reign and this would also turn out in Russia’s favor and benefit.
Russia has wedged Armenia, and in an effort to stay in power, the Armenian government requires extensive Russian economic, diplomatic and may be even military support. In the event a new government is formed by the current opposition, it is most likely that they would make demands of additional weaponry from Russia in preparation for the next confrontation, however hypothetically with Azerbaijan. In each of the cases, the price for more arms would likely be deeper integration of Armenia within the EEU. The remanence of Armenia’s policy struggles with the West is already under severe pressure since the Karabakh defeat would die.
Hypothetically, Russia remains to gain greater rewards – persuading Azerbaijan to allow the Russian peacekeeping mission to remain on its soil beyond the end of 2025. This means while Armenia is fighting to gain its status and recovery of its lost territory, it will have a government formed by an opposition that is die hard on developing a battle-ready military skilled with offensive operations that which would be a useful tool for the Kremlin to validate its continued presence of its units in Karabakh.
