Africa (Commonwealth) _ The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)’s resource-rich eastern regions have been used as bases of operations by several rebel groups for the last 25 years. Consequently, the area has become an ungoverned field of competition amongst its immediate neighbors.
The March 23 Movement (M23), a military organization, assaulted the Congolese army in North Kivu in November 2021, sparking the most recent round of unrest. The crisis was rekindled by the M23 attack, but its underlying roots were never resolved.
They date back to 1994, when two million refugees fled Rwanda’s genocide and sought safety in neighboring nations, mostly in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Through their backing of Laurent Kabila during the First Congo War (1996–1997), Rwanda and Uganda assisted in the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko, the president of Zaire (1965–1997).
Following a period of destabilization, armed organizations multiplied and started acting as proxy fighters in the area. Despite an Angolan-mediated cease-fire, fighting between the M23 and the DRC army returned in March 2022. Even if stability would help some of the major players in the dispute, a negotiated settlement appears improbable given the number of players engaged and their competing interests, as well as the resurgence of ethnic violence. A volatile element is added to all of these by the DRC’s impending presidential election.
failure of stabilization attempts
There are some concerning indications of escalation in spite of the regional mediation attempts Paul Kagame, the president of Rwanda, suspected the Congolese government of supplying the BM-21s, low-cost, highly lethal multiple missile launchers from the Soviet period, to the area and deploying them to bombard Rwandan territory. A fighter plane from the Congo is said to have breached Rwanda’s airspace in January 2023.
The M23 is moving closer to Goma, which is located in the Nord Kivu province that borders Rwanda and Uganda, just like it did in 2011. Though the M23 attack may have a different outcome this time around than it did twelve years ago when the group was finally stopped and a negotiated solution was achieved.
Reports of crimes by both sides against civilians, including summary executions and systematic rape, are stoking animosity and anxieties in a region already scarred by ethnic conflict and political disintegration. Hate speech has increased in frequency over the past few months.
Tutsi communities’ members assert that intimidation tactics have been used to keep them from registering to vote in the impending presidential elections in December. This strengthens the idea that Tutsis in the area are treated as second-class citizens and are subject to violent outbursts on a regular basis, giving the M23 acts a strong rationale. Anti-Tutsi animosity is stoked by the atrocities committed by the M23 rebels against civilians, which feeds the cycle of violence.
It appears that regional and international mediators have run out of credibility following years of consistent failure. At first, the regional attempts to replace the increasingly unpopular United Nations “stabilization mission” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were hailed as a practical application of the notion of “African solutions for African problems.” However, in practice, that has also proven to be challenging.
Military deployments
The already complicated position is made more complex by the two simultaneous procedures that are underway, each led by a regional power (Kenya and Angola). Diplomatic initiatives are accompanied by military deployments. Under the East African Community Regional Force, Kenyan and Burundian troops have been stationed, and Angola will also be sending military personnel. Similar circumstances existed prior to the Second Congo War (1998–2002).
Lastly, the battle might be characterized as a proxy war between two established adversaries in the region. It suggests that Kigali and Kinshasa may be losing their ability to sway the M23, the FDLR, and a host of other rebel organizations that are active in the area. For instance, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), who declared their support for the Islamic State and carried out terrorist strikes in Uganda, have expanded their sphere of influence and are currently regarded as the most dangerous organization in the area.
Direct talks between the Congolese government and the M23, as envisioned under the Kenyan mediation plan, have grown unrealistic as the violence intensifies and the DRC’s elections approach.
The dynamics of regional cooperation are being impacted by the escalating diplomatic tensions on the outside. President Tshisekedi of the DRC has sought to give his country more clout in regional and subregional organizations since taking office in 2019, creating a new front in the conflict with Rwanda. His efforts have yielded some outcomes. President Kagame recently accused the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) of keeping Rwanda out of the Economic Community of Central African States summit, which was held in the capital of that country. This indicates that his efforts are paying off.
International affairs
The main international actors—the US and the EU, for example—have refrained from outright denouncing Rwanda. It is generally agreed upon, although, that Kigali, which provides the rebels with arms, ammunition, and logistical support, is indirectly supporting M23. Concurrently, Rwandan intelligence agencies assert that the Congolese army works closely with the rebel forces (FDLR), which includes some of the perpetrators of the Tutsi massacre. Rwanda claims that the organization, which has been active in Congolese territory since 1996, was never disarmed and that Kinshasa uses them as a go-between to incite trouble in the unstable area.
Remarkably, Beijing has boosted its military aid to the DRC in recent years but refrained from advancing diplomatic overtures through its ambassadors. Even though the world is primarily concerned with the conflict in Ukraine, recent developments in the eastern Congo have raised concerns outside of the area. Following the failure of cease-fire efforts, a UN Security Council mission visited the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
