UK (Commonwealth) _ Britain withdrew from the Indo-UK trade agreement over 50 years ago. This agreement was just one of several bilateral deals with Commonwealth countries that Britain gave up in the early 1970s. Some believe that this decision marked the end of Britain’s global aspirations. The UK saw leaving these agreements as a necessary step towards joining the European Common Market. India, on the other hand, felt the loss of a significant benefit of its post-war Commonwealth membership.
Alexander Downer, Australia’s longest-serving foreign minister and a former Australian High Commissioner to the UK, and Chairman of the Commonwealth Enterprise and Investment Council, Lord Marland, discuss the emergence of a new cross-party turn towards the Commonwealth in a media column on Commonwealth Day.
Today’s coordinated attempt to push a new India-UK free trade agreement over the finish line is a positive step, in the opinion of those of us who believe that Britain’s future rests on the revival of Commonwealth links. In the event that a compromise cannot be established before the general election, the cross-party consensus on it is also in place.
This demonstrates Britain’s distinct course of travel: an eastward tilt where economic expansion is concentrated and where a large portion of the Commonwealth is situated.
Party-political consensus hasn’t always benefited Britain. The widely held belief following World War II that Britain had changed resulted in unusual choices. From this perspective, the flight to Europe with its trade protectionism and the cutting of Commonwealth relations throughout the globe could both be understood: Britain could not afford anything more. However, the numbers never backed up the opinion. Britain’s economy ranked fifth in the globe in 1913, maybe at the height of its might. It was the tenth biggest in 2023. A few say no.
Still, there was some sense in looking to the Continent given its disproportionate percentage of the world GDP in the early 1970s, when the final trade agreement with India was revoked. These days, there is essentially none, with 85% of the world economy located outside of Europe.
With all of the UK’s key post-Brexit free trade agreements—with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the eleven-country Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)—being in Asia, the trend eastward is gathering momentum as we approach Commonwealth Day this year. The sixth-generation fighter aircraft program with Japan and the Aukus submarine pact with Australia are examples of this as well. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting is scheduled to take place in Samoa, South Pacific, later this year. By design, all of this places Britain at the center of the economy of the twenty-first century, but it also inevitably places it at the center of its geopolitics. China is implied by this.
This nation is crucial to the Commonwealth’s rebirth, maybe even more so than free trade agreements. China has challenges in both trade and governance. Debt draws Asia’s countries—and increasingly those outside of it—into its orbit. A loan serves as a foundation for a government’s budget and later as a key indicator of its geopolitical trajectory. It quickly turns into a call for security personnel. This in turn splits a nation’s political establishment into pro-Western and pro-Chinese factions.
For twenty years, Australia has been involved in a geopolitical containment struggle with China on its need for a security presence in the Pacific. However, China’s debt, which is simple to get but opaque and presents policymakers with clear incentives, has significantly increased China’s economic clout and security posture. It is a trend that keeps happening.
As a result of a revitalized Asian economy, Britain has to get ready to engage more diplomatically. “Britain can find a role,” to misquote US Secretary of State Dean Acheson during the Truman administration. Britain may provide help to Commonwealth members who are under Chinese pressure by redirecting development, security, and governance initiatives towards their support. It seems appropriate to concentrate almost entirely on Commonwealth nations. Due to linguistic, cultural, and diasporic ties, British influence is most likely to resurface.
Despite recent reductions in assistance funding, the United Kingdom continues to be the world’s third-largest help donor. To strengthen trade links, some of it ought to be directed toward reestablishing diplomatic and security contacts with Commonwealth nations. It is quite feasible to elevate the UK to a position of significant influence in Asia for liberal ideals in economics and governance at a time when the west is glad to have greater weight in reaction to China’s ascent.
The signature of a new UK-India agreement will be a declaration of Britain’s growth, just as the cancellation of the previous one symbolized its waning aspirations. There is developing a new Asian and Commonwealth consensus, whether it happens before or after the election. The globe, Britain, and her friends will all profit from that.
