If BRICS can assemble an economic & political coalition with strategic intent, what prevents the Commonwealth nations from doing likewise? This is the challenging question Australia and its allies should be asking themselves. This is due to existing institutions failing to protect their interests, and states look to building new partnerships.
At the ’25 World Economic Forum, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney asserted that the rules-based order no longer guaranteed predictability. Institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and the United Nations are currently struggling to constrain major power rivalry. This is due to resource security, industrial policy, and supply-chain resilience increasingly defining statecraft. As such, middle powers are being compelled to form coalitions that reduce vulnerability.
The BRICS working model offers a case study in strategic pragmatism. Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and other countries in the bloc share a few political values. They operate under divergent economic systems. These nations see leverage in numbers when seeking autonomy and influence. They create development banks and settlement mechanisms, besides political signaling platforms, to hedge against Western dominance.
Australia may observe that development without alarmism. BRICS represents institutional entrepreneurship but not ideological unity. Members may need insulation from coercion besides greater control over finance, trade & technology, which could include mechanisms for collaboration and mutual support to strengthen their positions against external pressures. Such an approach may resonate well beyond the Global South.
The Commonwealth may join this discussion. Viewed as a ceremonial association with ties to imperial history, the Commonwealth is today criticized for uneven enforcement of democratic norms and a symbolic rather than operational focus. Member states have suffered subordination within an empire.
Reform may therefore precede ambition. Governance rules may need strengthening, with membership standards needing clarity. Economic coordination may need a sharper focus. Leaders may consider whether the name itself obscures modern intent.
The geography and economics of the 56 Commonwealth countries demonstrate diversity, besides opportunity. The bloc spans every major ocean basin and includes advanced industrial economies. This diversity is what the rapidly growing emerging markets, besides strategically located islands, may share. Several countries that do not have a British imperial history, such as Togo and Gabon, have joined the bloc to gain access and leverage.
Trade patterns highlight this opportunity. Intra-Commonwealth trade exceeds external trade and operates at lower transaction costs due to shared legal & linguistic systems. Use of the common law reduces contractual friction, which facilitates smoother transactions and enhances trust among trading partners in the Commonwealth. This advantage is due to business networks already operating across these corridors.
In partnership, Commonwealth countries have the capabilities to form a credible critical-minerals coalition. Australia & Canada are 2 of the world’s leading producers of lithium, besides other battery minerals. African members control substantial reserves of cobalt, manganese, graphite, & rare-earth elements. India brings scale to manufacturing and technological services. The UK offers capital markets & financial expertise.
Food security amplifies the leverage. Both Australia and Canada produce agricultural surpluses that may feed tens of millions beyond their borders. Several African countries, besides South Asian members, remain net importers vulnerable to price shocks, which can lead to food insecurity and economic instability in these regions. Structured supply guarantees within a trusted grouping may reduce exposure to external coercion, thereby enhancing food security and stabilizing prices for net importing countries. In such a fragmented world, a bloc that could simultaneously secure critical mineral supply chains, besides guaranteeing grain & fertilizer corridors, may have immense strategic leverage.
Maritime geography tends to strengthen this argument. Commonwealth members sit astride the Strait of Malacca. The focus is the approach to the Suez Canal, the Cape sea route, and critical Pacific sea lanes. Port access, refueling rights & logistics interoperability may create resilience. Naval cooperation may not need to mirror formal alliances. Reciprocal access arrangements alone may enhance deterrence besides disaster response capacity, as they can facilitate quicker military responses and improve operational readiness among allied forces.
In practical architecture, leaders may establish a strategic resource framework that is aligned with investment screening. Also, coordinated export controls that may also include mobilized blended finance for mining, besides processing projects across trusted jurisdictions. Development finance institutions and private capital may require clarity regarding risk-sharing mechanisms.
