As Pakistan prepares to host the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit next month, the presence or absence of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be closely scrutinized. On August 29, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Islamabad will welcome heads of government from SCO member states on October 15-16, marking the largest gathering of international leaders in the country since the 2012 Developing Nations conference. The following day, India’s Ministry of External Affairs confirmed receipt of the invitation but has yet to disclose whether Modi will attend. Given the ongoing tensions between the two South Asian nations, many analysts remain doubtful that the Indian leader will travel to Pakistan.
The implications of Modi’s potential absence extend beyond bilateral relations. The longstanding rivalry between India and Pakistan has significantly hampered the functioning of other regional organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), whose leaders have not convened in a decade. This raises concerns that the SCO, a strategic alliance spearheaded by China and Russia, might face similar disruptions.
Taimur Khan, a research associate at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), notes, “[The SAARC] precedent raises concerns for the SCO, where the same tensions could potentially disrupt the organization. However, the SCO’s robust framework, led by global powers like China and Russia, provides a different dynamic.”
The SCO, founded in 2001, includes Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran—the latest member. Last year, India hosted various SCO-related events, including a significant summit in July 2023. During that summit, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif participated virtually, following a contentious exchange between Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari over issues such as Kashmir and terrorism. With the roles reversed analysts remain skeptical about the likelihood of Modi visiting Islamabad. Sharat Sabharwal, former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, remarked, “It seems difficult with the current state of the relationship unless there are some positive developments between now and the summit.” Similarly, Maleeha Lodhi, former Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, expressed doubts about Modi’s attendance, citing the prevailing negative signals from New Delhi.
The primary source of tension between the two nations is the Kashmir region, a contested area in the Himalayas. The dispute over Kashmir has led to multiple conflicts, and since 1989, an armed insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir—allegedly supported by Pakistan—has persisted. In August 2019, Modi’s government revoked Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which granted partial autonomy to Kashmir, a move that Pakistan has strongly opposed.
Recently, Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar declared the end of the “era of uninterrupted dialogue” with Pakistan, emphasizing that “actions have consequences.” Jaishankar’s statement reaffirmed the Modi government’s stance on no dialogue in response to what it characterizes as “Pakistan-sponsored terror,” though he indicated that India would react to Pakistan’s actions, whether they are positive or negative. Sabharwal interprets Jaishankar’s statement as a reaffirmation of the current policy, noting that, If Pakistan continues to make the reversal of Article 370 a precondition for bilateral engagement, progress will remain elusive.
